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Abstract. The rapid development of the Internet and the wide spread of its applications has affected
many aspects of our life. However, this development also makes the cyberspace more vulnerable to
various attacks. Thus, detecting and preventing these attacks are crucial for the next development
of the Internet and its services. Recently, machine learning methods have been widely adopted in
detecting network attacks. Among many machine learning methods, AutoEncoders (AEs) are known
as the state-of-the-art techniques for network anomaly detection. Although, AEs have been success-
fully applied to detect many types of attacks, it is often unable to detect some difficult attacks that
attempt to mimic the normal network traffic. In order to handle this issue, we propose a new model
based on AutoEncoder called Double-Shrink AutoEncoder (DSAE). DSAE put more shrinkage on
the normal data in the middle hidden layer. This helps to pull out some anomalies that are very
similar to normal data. DSAE are evaluated on six well-known network attacks datasets. The expe-
rimental results show that our model performs competitively to the state-of-the-art model, and often
out-performs this model on the attacks group that is difficult for the previous methods.
Keywords. Deep learning; AutoEncoders; Anomaly detection; Latent representation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the fast increase of many cyber-attacks, seeking for solutions to identify and prevent
these attacks is a major task in network security. Recently, anomaly detection techniques have been
widely applied for automatically identifying intruders, malware and malicious activities in network
systems [13, 3]. Typical security systems for carrying out this task are known as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs). IDSs can be used as the second security layer behind firewalls to protect computer
networks from illegal and malicious activities [13, 23]. In IDSs, the anomaly detection-based appro-
ach is getting more popular because of its ability in detecting new network attacks. Among several
techniques for anomaly detection, machine learning techniques have been used as the main appro-
ach [12, 17, 2]. However, machine learning-based anomaly detection still suffers from some obstacles
such as high-dimensional data, the continuous evolution of network attacks, and the lack of attack
data and its labels for training the detection models [14, 11, 31].
Machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection are often divided into three categories: su-
pervised, unsupervised and semi-supervised learning. Of these, one-class classification (OCC) can
eliminate the challenges of lacking attack data and its corresponding labels since they can construct
anomaly detection models from only one class of data, usually the normal data. Any data point that
*Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: congthanhttmt@gmail.com (C.T.Bui); loicv79@gmail.com (L.C.Van);
hoangminh@most.gov.vn (M.Hoang); quanguyhn@gmail.com (Q.U.Nguyen).
c© 2020 Vietnam Academy of Science & Technology
160 CONG THANH BUI, et al.
does not fit the models well will be classified as anomaly [26]. OCCs have been used for identifying
anomalies in network security in many researches [10, 9, 33, 11]. However, OCC-based methods,
such as Support Vector Machine (SVM) [30] and Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [5], often perform in-
efficiently when the data is high-dimensional. Moreover, it is difficult to turn hyper-parameters for
these methods [28, 11].
Recently, Autoencoders (AEs) have been widely used for anomaly detection and they achieved
the state-of-the-art result in many researches [20, 18, 29]. AEs are feedforward neural networks
which learn to reconstruct the input at the output layer [4, 19]. The middle hidden layer attempts to
compress data into a lower-dimensional feature space: preserving non-redundant information while
removing the redundancies of the input data. A trained AE on normal data will behave well on
normal examples yielding small reconstruction errors (REs), whereas this AE will poorly reproduce
on anomaly instances creating larger REs. Thus, REs can be used as anomaly scores. Alternatively,
the middle hidden layer of an AE can be used as a new feature representation (latent representation)
and this latent presentation is the input to other anomaly detection algorithms [11, 9, 27, 6, 8].
Shrink AE (SAE) [11] is a typical model for learning the feature representation. SAE is an
extension of an ordinary AE by incorporating a regularizer to the loss function of the AE. SAE learn
to reconstruct the normal data as well as force this data into a tiny region in the latent space. SAE
achieves convincing results on a wide range of anomaly detection datasets. However, this model did
not perform well on some types of attacks, such as the Remote to Local attack group (R2L) [11,
see Tab. 3], which represent the most dangerous attack types [24]. The reason could be that R2L
embeds itself in data packets, and does not create a sequential patterns like DoS and Probe attacks,
thus the R2L traffic is very similar to the normal one [24, 1, 21]. In this paper, we propose a novel
model based on AE that attempts to address the shortcomings of SAE. The main contributions of
this paper are:
• We propose a new model namely Double-Shrink AutoEncoder (DSAE) for detecting some
particular types of network attacks which are difficult for SAE.
• We conduct extensive experiments on the well-known datasets, both synthetic and real datasets.
The results suggest that DSAE is better than SAE in detecting critical attacks such as R2L.
The remaining parts of the paper are as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we briefly present some rela-
ted work, and a complementary background of the paper. The proposed model, DSAE, is presented
in Section 4, Sections 5 and 6 describe our experimental settings and analyze experimental results.
Finally, we draw some conclusions and suggest the future work in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
This section briefly presents anomaly detection methods including Centroid, Autoencoder and
Shrink Autoencoder. These techniques will be used for developing and evaluating our proposed
methods in the following sections.
2.1. Centroid (CEN)
Centroid (CEN) [11] is a parametric method which uses a single Gaussian to model the training
data. Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} ∈ Rd be the training data, µj and σj be the mean and standard
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deviation of the j-th feature of the training data respectively, n is the number of data samples, X is
normalized by the z-score transformation on each feature using Equation (1)
zij =
xij − µj
σj
, (1)
where xij is the j-th element of xi, and zij is its z-score. In testing process, the distance from the
tested sample to the centroid is calculated and it reflects the anomaly degree of the observation.
2.2. AutoEncoder
An AutoEncoder (AE) is a type of artificial neural network [4, 19] that consists of two parts:
an encoder and a decoder. The encoder attempts to map input data into a latent feature space
in the hidden layer. This latent space is also called a bottleneck. Let fθ be the encoder, and
X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be a dataset. The encoder fθ will map the input xi ⊆ X into a latent vector
zi = fθ (xi) in the bottleneck. The decoder gθ learns to reconstruct the input data at the output
layer xˆi = gθ (zi) from the latent representation zi. The encoder and decoder are usually represented
in a form of an affine mappings as follows fθ (x) = sf (Wx+ b) and gθ (z) = sg (W
′z + b′), where
W, W
′
are the weight, b and b
′
are the bias, and sf and sg are the activation functions of the encoder
and decoder. The AE is trained to minimize the loss function (LossAE (θ)) called the reconstruction
error (RE). RE is the difference between the input xi and its reconstruction xˆi and it can be measured
by mean square error (MSE) for real-valued data, and cross entropy for binary data. When using
MSE, the loss function of an AE over training samples can be calculated as Equation 2.
LossAE (θ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(xi − xˆi)2 , (2)
where θ represents the parameters of the AE, m is the number of training examples.
2.3. Shrink Autoencoder
Shrink Autoencoder (SAE) is an extension of AEs introduced recently by Cao et al. [11]. In SAE,
a new regularizer is added to the loss function of an AE. This aims to encourage the AE to construct a
compact feature representation for normal data in the hidden layer which facilitates the performance
of the anomaly detection algorithms that are applied on the top of the feature representation. The
AE loss function in Equation (2) can be redefined as follows
LossSAE (θ) = LossRE (θ) +Regularizer (θ) . (3)
The first component in Equation (3) is RE (the loss of an ordinary AE), and the second one is
the regularized term which is designed to restrict the hidden data to be centered at the origin in the
latent feature space. The SAE loss can be precisely defined as
LossSAE (θ) =
1
m
(
m∑
i=1
(xi − xˆi)2 + α
m∑
i=1
‖zi‖2
)
, (4)
where xˆi and zi are the reconstruction and the latent vector of the observation xi, respectively. m
is the number of training examples, and α is the trade-off parameter.
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3. RELATED WORK
This section presents a brief review of the previous research on anomaly detection using AutoEn-
coders. AutoEncoders can be employed for anomaly detection following two common approaches:
(1) Using AEs stand-alone [18, 15]; (2) Using the bottleneck layer as a new feature representation in
hybrid models [14, 11, 9, 28, 27, 35].
In the first approach, an AE can be trained on only normal data to minimize the reconstruction
error, ‖x− xˆ‖2. The trained AE will captures the normal behavior well, and it yields small REs on
normal examples. Anomalies that are often different from normal data will not fit the model and
have large REs. Thus, REs are usually used as the anomaly score of a querying example. Hawkins
et al. [18] used the RE of an AE with narrow middle layer as an indicator of anomalies. The model
was evaluated on the Wisconsin Breast Cancer and the KDD99 datasets. The experimental results
showed that the model produced very high accuracy. Fiore et al. [15] constructed an AE architecture,
called Discriminative Restricted Boltzmann Machines (DRBM), to test the hypothesis that normal
behaviors may exist a deep similarity. They expected that their model can represent all the common
characteristics of normal traffic, and use them to distinguish unseen anomalous traffic from normal
traffic. The authors evaluated their model on both real-world network traces and the KDD99 datasets.
Their experimental results confirmed that their model could perform efficiently on data collected from
the same network as that in the training phase. When the testing environment being greatly different
from the training one their model produced poor performance.
In some scenarios, well-known anomaly detection algorithms often suffer challenges posed by data
such as the curse of dimensionality, irrelevant/redundant features. Therefore, the bottleneck layer of
AEs have also been used as a new feature representation of lower dimension. Rajashekar et al. [27]
proposed a hybrid between an AE and a self-organizing map (SOM) for representing the smartphone
users’ normal behavior. In this model, the authors used an AE to capture the most important
characteristics of the users behavior. A SOM was then stacked on the output of the encoder of the
AE. Veeramachaneni et al. [35] introduced an ensemble model that combines three single anomaly
detection models: AE-based, density-based, and matrix decomposition-based models. The models
were evaluated on a large network log dataset, and produced a good performance. Erfani et al. [14]
used an AE architecture, called deep belief network (DBN), to enhance the performance of anomaly
detection techniques in solving the curse of dimensionality in high-dimensional data. OCSVMs were
then built on top of the DBN. This model has the advantages of the nonlinear feature reduction of
the DBN and high detection accuracy of OCSVMs.
Recently, Cao et al. [11] proposed a new version of AE called Shrink AutoEncoder (SAE) for
anomaly detection. Their model forces the hidden representation of normal data into a very tight
area centered at the origin of the bottleneck by adding a new regularizer to the loss function of the
AE. The hidden layer of the trained SAE will be then used as a new data representation for well-
known anomaly detection algorithms, such as OCSVM. The experimental results showed that their
approaches achieved very convincing results compared to the state-of-the-art AEs on a wide range of
problems.
In this paper, we will propose a new model to leverage the performance of SAE in identifying
attacks that are difficult for SAE. The detailed description of our model will be described in the next
section.
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4. DOUBLE-SHRINK AUTOENCODER
Our model attempts to detect the attacks that are difficult for SAE [11]. As mentioned in the
privious section, SAE works based on the way, the encoder will lead normal data toward the origin,
whereas anomalies will push far away from the center.
(a) Training model
(b) Testing model
Figure 1. Our proposal model
We assume that SAE is failed to detect some kinds of attacks that mimic the normal data. In
this scenario, the latent vectors of these attacks are close to the latent vectors of the normal region in
SAE. Our model aims to increase the shrink pressure on the normal latent vectors to separate these
attacks from the normal vectors. In other words, we incorporate one more shrink pressure into SAE
to form a new model called Double-shrink AutoEncoder (DSAE). Figure 1 presents the training and
testing phases of DSAE. DSAE is trained by only normal data, the normal data is passed as the first
input to DSAE. The output of the decoder will then also be used as the second input of DSAE. The
model learns to minimize the reconstruction losses and driving latent vectors (z1 and z2) towards the
center of the latent space. So that, the attack network traffic that are very similar to normal network
traffic after pass the first shrinkage will also produce a small reconstruction errors (REs), but indeed,
that output vector should be more likely to anomalous so by pushing to the second shrinkage, it will
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lead the latent vector (z2) go far away. In the training phase, the normal data is passed as the first
input to DSAE. The output of the decoder will then also be used as the second input of DSAE. The
model learns to minimize the reconstruction losses (call RE1 and RE2 and driving latent vectors (z
1
and z2) towards the center of the latent space, z1 = fθ (x), that is latent vector at the bottleneck
of the first shrink, z2 = fθ
(
gθ
(
z1
))
is latent vector at the bottleneck of the second shrink. In the
testing phase, z2 is used as the new feature representation for subsequent anomaly detection methods
such as CEN.
The first and the second reconstruction errors (RE1 and RE2) can be defined as follows
LRE1 (θ, xi) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
xi − xout1i
)2
, (5)
LRE2 (θ, xi) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
xout1i − xout2i
)2
, (6)
where θ is the parameters of DSAE, m is the number of the training data points, and xi, x
out1
i
and xout2i are the input data point i and its reconstruction values in the first and second shrinks
respectively. Thus, the RE component of the DSAE loss can be written as in Equation (7)
LRE (θ, xi) = LRE1 (θ, xi) + LRE2 (θ, xi) . (7)
The shrink term of the DSAE loss is the sum of the first shrink and the second shrink components
in the following equations.
LZ1 (θ, xi) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥z1i ∥∥2 , (8)
LZ2 (θ, xi) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∥∥z2i ∥∥2 , (9)
LZ (θ, xi) = LZ1 (θ, xi) + LZ2 (θ, xi) , (10)
where z1i and z
2
i are the latent vectors of the input data xi under the first shrink and the second
shrink pressures respectively, and m is the number of the training data points.
The last component of the DSAE lost function is a weight decay regularizer on the network
parameters W presented in Equation (11) below
LW (θ, xi) =
L∑
l=1
∥∥∥W l∥∥∥2
F
, (11)
where ‖.‖F denotes the Frobenius norm [17].
Therefore, the loss function of DSAE is defined as follows
LDSAE (θ, xi) = LRE (θ, xi) + α ∗ LZ (θ, xi) + β ∗ LW (θ, xi) , (12)
where α and β are parameters for controlling the trade-off between the three terms in the DSAE
loss function. In this paper, we naturally choose α = 10 followed the settings by Cao et al. [11], and
β = 0.001 as in [34].
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5. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
This section describes the datasets and the experimental settings used in the paper.
5.1. Datasets
Our experiments aims to highlight the performance of DSAE in detecting the attacks that are
difficult for SAE. We employed three well-known network datasets [7] for our experiments, namely
CTU13 [16], UNSW-NB15 [25] and NSL-KDD [32]. In these datasets, we consider all kinds of attacks
as anomalies while the data created by users is normal.
Table 1. Datasets using for experiments
Dataset
Dimension
origin/after
one-hot encoding
Trainning set Testing sets
Normal Abnormal
NSLKDD 44/122 67343 9711 12833
UNSW-NB15 47/196 56000 37000 45332
CTU-13 08 16/40 29128 43694 3677
CTU-13 09 16/41 11986 17981 110998
CTU-13 10 16/38 6338 9509 63812
CTU-13 13 16/40 12775 19164 24002
• NSL-KDD [32] is an effective benchmark for anomaly detection methods that consists of a
training set (KDDTrain+) and a testing set (KDDTest+). Each sample in NSL-KDD composes
of 41 features with an additional label. The samples can be labelled either as normal or one
of the four main attack groups including Denial of service (DoS), Remote to Local (R2L),
User to Local (U2R), and Probe. Among the four attack groups, R2L was considered to be
one of the most challenging for machine learning algorithms to detect [24]. R2L is embedded in
their data packets itself, and does not form sequential patterns like DoS and Probe. Therefore,
the network traffic of R2L tends to be very similar to the normal network traffic. DSAE
is designed to perform efficiently on this attack group. For R2L, there are 995 instances in
KDDTrain+ and 2887 instances in KDDTest+.
• UNSW-NB15 [25] published in 2015 consists of the training set and the testing set. Each
sample in UNSW-NB15 composes of 47 features and a label. There are nine attack types in
UNSW-NB15 including fuzzers, analysis, backdoor, DoS, exploit, generic, reconnaissance,
shellcode, and worm.
• The CTU13 [16] is a botnet dataset that consists of thirteen botnet scenarios. In this paper,
we only use four scenarios in CTU13, and split each of them into 40% for training (normal
traffic) and 60% for evaluating (normal and botnet traffic) [22].
All categorical features of three datasets are converted into real-values using one-hot-encoding.
This results in higher dimensional versions of the tested data (the second column in Table 1).
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5.2. Parameter settings
The settings for the hyper-parameters in DSAE are similar to the previous works [14, 9]. The
number of hidden layers is five [14], the size of the bottleneck layer, m is chosen using the rule [9],
m = [1 +
√
n], where n is the number of input features, the batch size is 100, the hyperbolic
tangent function is applied to all layers in DSAE except the bottleneck in which the sigmoi function
is used. The loss function of DSAE in Equation (3) is optimized by using an adaptive SGD algorithm
(ADADELTA) over 1000 epochs.
We conducted two experiments to examine the characteristics of DSAE. The first experiment
is to compare the performance of DSAE to the previous model including SAE [11] and Denoising
AutoEncoder (DAE) [36]. The second one is to assess the ability of DSAE in detecting the attacks
that are difficult for SAE.
To measure the performance of the tested methods, we used the Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC) metric. The higher value of AUC a model produces, the better performance the model has.
For each dataset, we executed the algorithms 10 times and the average value of AUC is reported.
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first experiment aims to compare the performance of DSAE with SAE and Denoising AutoEn-
coder (DAE) on six well-known anomaly detection datasets. The results are presented in Table 2.
In this table, we present the result of two version of DAE and SAE. One version (DAE+RE and
SAE+RE) uses RE as the score for anomaly detection. The other version applies CEN on the latent
representation of DAE and SAE. For DSAE we only present the results of DSAE+CEN since the
version of DSAE+RE is less convincing. It can be seen that the AUCs of SAE and DSAE are mostly
equal on the tested datasets and these values are often better than that of DAE. This result con-
firms that our proposed model performs comparatively in comparison to SAE and it is better than
DAE. The second experiment is to compare the performance of DSAE and SAE on the dataset that
Table 2. AUCs from DAE, SAE, DSAE on six datasets
Datasets
Tested Anomaly
Model
NSLKDD UNSW CTU13-08 CTU13-09 CTU13-10 CTU13-13
DAE∗ + CEN 0.854 ±0.002 0.690 ±0.001 0.938 ±0.015 0.655±0.031 0.951±0.006 0.711±0.002
DAE+RE 0.930±0.090 0.873±0.004 0.960±0.011 0.903±0.002 0.958±0.004 0.952±0.010
SAE∗∗+CEN 0.960 ±0.002 0.896 ±0.006 0.982 ±0.009 0.940 ±0.010 0.997 ±0.001 0.964 ±0.012
SAE+RE 0.920 ±0.000 0.810 ±0.001 0.951 ±0.013 0.703 ±0.020 0.997 ±0.000 0.887 ±0.005
DSAE + CEN 0.963 ±0.004 0.895 ±0.015 0.986 ±0.012 0.929 ±0.054 0.992 ±0.008 0.971 ±0.006
∗ DAE: Denoising AutoEncoder; ∗∗ SAE: Shrink AutoEncoder [11]
is difficult for SAE. Table 3 presents the results of DSAE and SAE on four attack groups of NSL-
KDD. This table shows that DSAE is competitive with SAE on three attack groups (Probe, DoS,
and U2R). However, on the most difficult attacks, i.e., the R2L attack group, DSAE (AUC of 0.936)
out-performs SAE (AUC of 0.924). This result demonstrates that DSAE improve the performance of
SAE in detecting the difficult attacks.
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Table 3. AUCs from SAE, DSAE on four attack groups of NSL-KDD dataset
Datasets
Tested Anomaly
Model
Probe DoS R2L U2R
SAE + CEN ∗ 0.977 ±0.003 0.967 ±0.002 0.924 ±0.010 0.956 ±0.005
DSAE + CEN 0.979 ±0.006 0.966 ±0.007 0.936 ±0.011 0.960 ±0.010
∗ SAE + CEN: Shrink AutoEncoder and Centroid [11]
Table 4. Comparison the Detection between SAE and DSAE model on R2L attack group
Tested Anomaly
Model
R2L Attack group
TP FP FN TN FAR DETECTION RATE
SAE + CEN ∗ 1892 995 1008 8702 0.104 0.655
DSAE + CEN 2011 876 989 8721 0.102 0.697
∗ SAE + CEN: Shrink AutoEncoder and Centroid [11]
Table 4 shows the false alarm rate (FAR) and the detection rate (DR) of SAE and DSAE on R2L
attack group. This result is calculated using the threshold equal 0.9. In other words, the threshold is
selected so that 90% of samples are predicted as normal and the rest is predicted as abnormal. It can
be seen from this table that on R2L attack group, DSAE is better than SAE on both metrics. More
precisely, the FAR of DSAE is slighly lower than that of SAE (0.102 vs 0.104) and DR of DSAE is
much higher than SAE (0.697 vs 0.655). Overall, the results in this section show that our proposed
model, DSAE, performs equally effectively on the easy IDS datasets and it is much better than the
state-of-the-art model, i.e. SAE, on the most difficult attack group.
To show how DSAE performs better than SAE on R2L, we carried out some investigations on
latent vectors (both normal and anomalies) that are assigned different labels by SAE and DSAE. Since,
the dimension of the latent vectors of SAE and DSAE is higher than two, we convert these vectors
into two dimensions by calculating their Euclidean distances to the origin in the latent representation.
The coordinates, xi and yi of each latent vector zi are then computed as in Algorithm 1. We first
visualize normal and anomaly data samples that are miss-classified by SAE, but correctly classified
by DSAE in Figs. 2a and 2b. The data samples inside the yellow circle (a threshold) are classified
as normal data, and outside are considered as anomalies. The threshold are selected so that DSAE
can correctly classify 90%, 95% and 97% the normal training data. In the visualization, we set
the threshold at 90%. Second, we plot the data samples that are correctly identified by SAE, but
miss-classified by DSAE shown in Figs. 2a and Figs. 2c and 2d. It can be seen from these figures that
DSAE performs very efficiently. Many data samples miss-classified by SAE are correctly predicted
by DSAE. However, the second shrink pressure in DSAE also leads to some data samples (both
normal and abnormal) that have been correctly identified by the first shrink being wrongly classified.
Nevertheless, the figure shows that the number of incorrect samples by DSAE is much less than the
number of incorrect samples by SAE particularly with normal samples (Fig. 2d).
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[h!]
(a) Anomaly points are identified incorrectly by SAE, but correctly classified by DSAE
(b) Normal points are identified incorrectly by SAE, but correctly classified by DSAE
(c) Anomaly points are already identified correctly by SAE, but incorrectly classified by DSAE
(d) Normal points are already identified correctly by SAE, but incorrectly classified by DSAE
Figure 2. Monitoring points are identified incorrectly or correctly by SAE (left), but correctly
or incorrectly classified by DSAE (right) using Visualize latent vectors in 2D
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Algorithm 1 Visualize latent vectors in 2D
Input: a set of latent vectors (Z)
Output: a set of point (xi, yi) ∈ P in 2D
1: Calculate Euclidean distance (dzi) for each point zi ∈ Z to the origin.
2: P ← {}
3: for i = 0 to the size of Z do
4: get α is random number between 0 to 360
5: xi ← cosα ∗ dzi
6: yi ← sinα ∗ dzi
7: add p(xi, yi) to P
8: end for
9: return P
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a novel AE-based model, namely double-shrink autoencoder (DSAE) for
network anomaly detection. DSAE aims to increase the ability in detecting the difficult detection
attacks, such as the R2L attack group in NSL-KDD, whose network traffic is very similar to the
normal traffic. The main idea in DSAE is to use double shrink to separate these types of attacks
from the normal data. We conducted extensive experiments on six benchmark datasets in the domain
of network anomaly detection. These consist of comparing the performance of DSAE against SAE and
DAE, evaluating the ability of DSAE in detecting specific attack group (e.i R2L). The experimental
results confirm that our proposed model not only performs comparatively to SAE, but also tends to
out-perform SAE on the network traffic associated with the attacks tending to be very similar to the
traffic of normal data, such as R2L.
There are a number of research directions for future work. Firstly, the normal network data may
be presented in several group of similar of data (or clusters), thus finding clusters in the normal
data may be a good processed step for the later learning processes of SAE. This means that we can
develop SAE to learn multi-clusters in the latent feature space instead of only one cluster. Second,
we will evaluate DSAE on a wide range of anomaly detection problems as well as synthetic data
to demonstrate the ability in detecting the attack group whose behavior is very similar to normal
behavior.
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